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In re RAYNATOM CARMEN, on Habeas Corpus.

)

[1] Habeas Corp1l&-Want of Jurisdiction-Showing on Face of
Record.-In the absence of exceptional circumstances, petitioner on habeas corpus may not contest, in his collateral attack
on final judgments of conviction, the trial court's determination
and exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of new and additional
facts that do not appear in the trial court record.
[2] ld.-Want of Jurisdiction-Showing on Face of B.ecord.Traditionally, the inquiry on habeas corpus has been limited
to an examination of facts appearing on the face of the record
and no evidence dehors the record has been received to impeach the judgment, though the scope of inquiry has been
extended to embrace additional evidence in instances where
petitioner contested the validity of a final judgment of conviction on the ground that he had been denied the aid of
counsel, that his conviction had been secured solely by perjured testimony knowingly used by prosecuting officials, or
that the law under which he had been convicted was unconstitutional.
[3] ld.-Want of Jurisdiction-Showing on Face of Record.Departure from the traditional scope of inquiry on habeas
corpus, so as to permit consideration of new and additional
facts that do not appear in the trial court record, is not warranted where petitioner's claims of lack of jurisdiction are
based entirely on federal statutes, the effect of which has been
changed since petitioner committed his offenses, by legislation
giving the courts of this state unquestioned jurisdiction over
offenses committed in "All Indian country within the State!'
(18 U.S.C. § 1162.)
[4] ld.-Want of Jurisdiction-Showing on Face of Record.Where petitioner had opportunity to raise a jurisdictional
question by presenting the alleged facts at his trial, but he
failed to do so and, on the facts there alleged and proved, the
trial court's implied determination that it had jurisdiction
was correct, he cannot relitigate that issue on habeas corpus.
[5] Criminal Law - Jurisdiction. - Federal jurisdiction over offenses committed within the state, which offenses are defined
by state law, is exceptional and, in trials in the courts- in this
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 17; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpna,
§§ 26, 27.
KcK. Dig. Befere~ces: [1-4] Habeaa Corpus, 110; [6] Criminal
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state, claims of federal jurisdiction are ordinarily defensive
matter.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Writ denied.
Mason A. Bailey and Leonard J. Bloom for Petitioner.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, and Arlo E. Smith, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
SPENCE, J.-Petitioner, Rayna Tom Carmen, is confined
in the state prison at San Quentin under judgments of conviction of first degree murder and of assault with intent to
commit murder. He seeks his release from custody upon
alleged jurisdictional grounds.
Petitioner was first convicted of the two offenses in the
Superior Court of Madera County in 1950. Wilbur Dan
McSwain was the victim of the murder and Alvin McSwain
was the victim of the assault. The crimes were committed
near the home of the victims. The initial altercation between
the parties had occurred earlier the same morning at a point
in Madera County some miles distant from the scene of the
crimes. After that altercation petitioner had driven to his
home, had obtained a gun, and had then driven to the home
of the victims to await their return. The shooting occurred
immediately following their return, while Alvin McSwain was
still in an automobile and Wilbur Dan McSwain was standing
near it.
At the first trial it was alleged and proved that the crimes
had been committed in Madera County. Petitioner was convicted of both offenses and was sentenced to imprisonment for
the term prescribed by law on the assault count and to suffer
the death penalty on the murder count. Upon appeal, this
court affirmed the assault conviction and reversed the murder
conviction. (People v. Carmen, 36 Ca1.2d 768 [228 P.2d
281] .)
At the second trial in the Superior Court of Madera
County petitioner was again convicted of first degree murder
for the killing of Wilbur Dan McSwain and was again
sentenced to suffer the death penalty. It was again alleged
and proved that the murder had been committed in Madera
County.
At the time of oral argument before this court on the appeal
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from the second murder conviction, it was suggested for the
first time that facts might be adduced showing that the
murder had been committed on a small tract of land within
Madera County known as an "Indian allotment," that such
allotment constituted "Indian country," and that petitioner
was an "Indian," within the meaning of those terms as used in
certain federal statutes, with the result that exclusive jurisdiction over the offense might be vested in the federal courts.
(See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151, 1152, 1153, and 3242, as amended
May 24, 1949.) Petitioner thereupon filed an application to
produce on the appeal additional evidence relating to the
newly suggested facts. This court denied the application and
affirmed the second judgment of conviction. (People v.
Carmen, 43 CaL2d 342 [273 P.2d 521J.) Noting that the
facts shown in the trial court record were insufficient to show
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts, this court stated
that "Since the defendant committed the crime in a county
of this state, it may not be assumed that any special circumstances existed which would deprive the state of jurisdiction."
(P.349.)
Thereafter petitioner commenced this habeas corpus proceeding, claiming a lack of jurisdiction in the courts of this
state on the basis of allegations that he and the McSwains were
"Indian!:" and that the murder and the assault had been
committed in "Indian country." Because of the alleged
jurisdictional questions involved, this court issued a writ of
habeas corpus and made an order of reference for the purpose
of determining the status of petitioner and Wilbur Dan McSwain, as well as the locus of the crimes. Hearings were
conducted and the referee filed his findings with this court.
The People contend that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the referee's findings concerning the status of petitioner
and Wilbur Dan McSwain. Upon further consideration, however, we have concluded that it is unnecessary to determine the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the referee's findings or
the adequacy of said findings. [1] We have reached this
conclusion because we are of the opinion that in the absence
of exceptional circumstances, which are not present here,
petitioner may uot contest, in this collateral attack upon the
final jUdgments of conviction, the trial court's determination
and exercise of jurisdiction, upon the basis of new and additional facts which do not appear in the trial court record.
[2] We are he-fe concerned with the nature of the inquiry
which may be made on habeas corpus where it is claimed that
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a trial court of general jurisdiction lacked jurisdiction over
an offense by reason of the status of the parties involved and
the place at which the crime occurred Traditionally the inquiry on habeas corpus has been limited to an examination of
facts appearing upon the face of the record and no evideuce
dehors the record has been received to impeach the jUdgment.
(In re Selvwsky, ]89 Cal. 331 [208 P. 99] ; In re Stevenson,
187 Cal. 773 [204 P. 216] ; In re Nicholson, 24 Cal.App.2d 15
[74 P.2d 288] ; In re Mirando, 15 Cal.App.2d 443 [59 P.2d
544J ; In re Murphy, 79 Cal.App. 64 [248 P. 1044J; In re
Ballas, 53 Cal.App. 109 [199 P. 816] ; In re Todd, 44 Cal.App.
496 [186 P. 790] ; see also 39 C.J.S., Habeas Corpus, § 16, p.
456.) However, it was said in In re Oonnor, 16 Ca1.2d 701,
712 [108 P.2d 10], that cc [t]he scope of inquiry on habeas
corpus in this state may ... under exceptional circumstances,
extend over the entire course of proceedings in the lower
courts ... and may embrace additional evidence received by
this court either directly or under an order of reference."
The scope of inquiry has been so extended in instances where
a petitioner has contested the validity of a final judgment of
conviction upon the ground that he had been denied the aid
of counsel (In re Oonnor, supra, 16 Cal.2d 701) ; or that his
conviction had been secured solely by perjured testimony
knowingly used by prosecuting officials (In re Mooney, 10 Cal.
2d 1 [73 P.2d 554]) ; or that the law under which he had been
convicted was unconstitutional (In re Bell, 19 Ca1.2d 488 [122
P.2d 22]).
[3] The asserted grounds of claimed lack of jurisdiction in
the instant case, however, do not appear to be of such nature
as would warrant a departure from the traditional scope of
inquiry or would permit the consideration of new and additional facts alleged by petitioner-which do not appear in the
trial court record. The situation here presented is not one in
which the asserted lack of jurisdiction is based upon a claim
by petitioner that he was convicted of violating an unconstitutional law or was denied any fundamental constitutional
right. (See In re Bell, supra, 19 Ca1.2d 488, 501-502.) On
the contrary, petitioner's claims are based entirely upon federal statutes (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151, 1152, 1153, and 3242), the
effect of which has been changed since petitioner committed his
offenses, by legislation giving the courts of this state unquestioned jurisdiction over offenses committed in "All Indian
country within the state." (18 U.S.C.A. § 1162, as amended
Aug. 24, 1954.) .
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[4] Petitioner had the opportunity to raise the jurisdictional question here involved by presenting the alleged facts
at his trials. He failed to do so and, upon the facts there
alleged and proved, the trial court's implied determination
that it had' jurisdiction over the offenses was correct.' To
permit petitioner to now relitigate that issue would encourage
defendants charged with crimes, the jurisdiction over which
might depend upon complex factual determinations, to withhold the raising of those issues until after they had attempted
to obtain a favorable result at a trial on the merits, and
perha.ps until such time as a conviction by the court claimed
to have jurisdiction would be impossible by reason of the
statute of limitations, or otherwise. (See Ex parte Wallace,
infra, 81 Okla. Crim. 176 [162 P.2d 205].) The sanction of
such procedure would permit piecemeal litigation of factual
issues which should be finally determined upon a single trial.
[5] Federal jurisdiction over offenses which are committed
within the boundaries of this state and which are defined by
state law is exceptional and, in trials in the courts of this state,
such jurisdictional claims are ordinarily defensive matter.
(See People v. Collins, 105 Cal. 504, 509 [89 P. 16].) Petitioner therefore should have alleged and proved in the trial
court any facts which he now claims might have had the
effect of vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts.
The foregoing conclusions are supported by both state and
federal authority. In State v. Utecht, 220 Minn. 481 [19
N.W.2d 706, 161 A.L.R. 1316], and Ex parte Wallace, IUpra,
81 Okla Crim. 176 [162 P.2d 205], the problem presented was
almost identical with that involved here. Petitioners therein
by collateral attack on habeas corpus attempted for the first
time to contest the jurisdiction of the state courts of general
jurisdiction which had convicted them. It was claimed that
petitioners were "Indians" and that the crimes of which
they had been convicted had been committed in "Indian
country." Relief was deni.ed in both cases upon the ground
that the determination of jurisdiction by a trial court of general jurisdiction was not subject to collateral attack on habeas
corpus where petitioners had not contested the jurisdiction of
the court at the trial nor brought to the trial court's attention
facts from which lack of jurisdiction could have been determined, and where upon the face of the trial court record there
was no showing of .lack of jurisdiction. (See also 89 C.J.S.,
Habeas Corpus,. f16, p. 456; 25 Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus,
§ 26, p. 161.) While in neither of the cited cases did peti-
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tioner attempt to raise the jurisdictional question upon appeal
as was done in the instant case, the attempt herein, as heretofore noted, was unsuccessful. (People v. Carmen, supra, 43
Ca1.2d 342.) That factor, therefore, would not appear to be
a distinguishing one.
On numerous occasions the federal courts have likewise
held that a final judgment of conviction may not be attacked
on habeas corpus upon allegations of new and additional facts
claimed to show that the convicting court lacked jurisdiction
over the offense because of the alleged status of the parties
or the alleged place where the crime was committed, at least
when there was no affirmative showing of lack of jurisdiction
upon the face of the trial court record. (Toy Toy v. Hopkins,
212 U.S. 542 [29 S.Ct. 416, 53 L.Ed. 644] ; Davis v. Johnston,
144 F.2d 862; Hatten v. Hudspeth, 99 F.2d 501; Ex parte
Savage, 158 F. 205; see also Rodman v. Pothier, 264 U.S. 399
[44 S.Ot. 360, 68 L.Ed. 759] ; In re Linooln, 202 U.S. 178 [26
S.Ct. 602, 50 L.Ed. 984] ; Walsh v. Johnston, 115 F.2d 806;
Walsh v. Aroher, 73 F.2d 197; Aroher v. Heath, 30 F.2d 932;
United States v. Lair, 195 F. 47 [115 C.C.A. 49].)
Certain of the cited federal cases involved petitioners claiming that the federal courts which had convicted them lacked
jurisdiction because the petitioners therein were C• allotted
Indians" and no longer wards of the government (Toy Toy v.
Hopkins, supra; Ex parte Savage, supra), or that the locus of
the crime was no longer "Indian country" (Toy Toy v.
Hopkins, supra ; Davis v. Johnston, supra; Hatte1'/. v. Hudspeth, supra). In each instance the court refused to redetermine the question of jurisdiction. Moreover, the refusal was
not made dependent upon whether the jurisdictional issue had
been raised at the trial or whether at the time of trial petitioner was aware of the facts upon which the alleged lack of
jurisdiction was later asserted. Thus in Davis v. Johnston,
supra, 144 F.2d 862, it was said: "In appellant's petition
he states that he did not object to the jurisdiction of the
court in the trial of the criminal case for the reason, he
now alleges that he was not aware of the fact that the store
building in which the crime was committed was not within the
reservation. The decision of the court in the criminal case
upon the factual question of jurisdiction is equally conclusive
whether or not it was raised by the defendant."
The case of Tooisgah v. United States, 186 F.2d 93, is Dot
helpful to petitioner. There an Indian sought redetermination
of the trial court's jurisdiction by a motion to vacate under

-.)
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section 2255, title 28, United States Code Annotated. The
court, one judge dissenting, reexamined the question of jurisdiction, found as a matter of law that it was lacking, and
directed that the judgment be vacated. The court was careful,
however, to distinguish two of the above cited cases, stating
at pages 95·96: "Unlike Hatten v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 99
F.2d 501, and Davis v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 144 F.2d 862, no new
or additional facts are sought to be injected into the case,
and no adjudicated facts are sought to be impeached." It
appears clear from the quoted language that the present case is
likewise distinguishable, since we determined on the second
appeal (People v. Oarmen, supra, 43 Ca1.2d 342) that there
were no facts in the trial court record which showed lack of
jurisdiction in the trial court. Petitioner's claim is therefore
wholly dependent upon new and additional facts which he
seeks to inject into this proceeding as the basis for his collateral attack. Under the rule established by the numerous
state and federal decisions, such collateral attack is not permitted under the circumstances j and if there may be said to
be anything in the opinions in State ex reI. Irvine v. District
Oourt, 125 Mont. 398 [239 P.2d 272], or Application of Andy,
49 Wn.2d 449 [302 P.2d 963], which lends support to petitioner's position, it is to that extent out of harmony with the
established rule and should not be followed.
The established rule was clarified but not modified in Bowen
v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 [59 S.Ct. 442, 83 L.Ed. 455],
where it was said that the traditional limitations on inquiry
on habeas corpus may, in some situations, "yield to exceptional
circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the
writ of habeas corpus is apparent." The court there determined that the important and unanswered conflict then existing between federal and state authorities concerning the
purely legal question of their respective claims to jurisdiction
over a national park constituted such "exceptional circumstances. "
,
The trial court record "there showed that the murder had
been committed "on the Government Reservation known as
the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park within the
exterior limits of the State of Georgia" (p. 21) j and "The
sole question was whether this Park was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States" (p. 23). The question of
jurisdiction was therefore a "quf'Rtion of law" (p. 27) rather
than of fact, as it-depended solely "upon the terms of the
consent or cession given by the legislature of Georgia," of
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which the court took "judicial notice." (P. 23.) The court \
there determined as a matter of law that the federal court
had jurisdiction and it affirmed the judgment of the Circuit
Court, which affirmed the judgment of the District Court
denying the petition for habeas corpus. No attempt had been
made in that case to present any new or additional facts concerning jurisdiction in the habeas corpus proceeding. The
court there merely found "exceptional circumstances" to justify its determination on habeas corpus of an important question of law following a final judgment of conviction. The
discussion in that case of the decisions in Toy Toy v. Hopkins,
""pra, 212 U.S. 542, Rodman v. Pothier, IUpra, 264 U.S. 399,
and Walsh v. Archer, supra, 73 F.2d 197, clearly shows that
the court did not intend to modify the general rule established
by those decisions. (See Davis v. Johnston, ""pra, 144 F.2d
862, 863.)
Similarly, the case of Ez parte Van Moore, 221 F. 954,
was found to present "exceptional circumstances" in that
long after petitioner's conviction in the state court of South
Dakota, the United States Supreme Court had determined
as a matter of law, contrary to the prior determinations of the
courts of South Dakota and other jurisdictions, that Indian
allotments held in trust outside of Indian reser:vations had at
all times been within the meaning of "Indian country" as
that term was used in the federal statutes. As the court said
at page 971," IT]he recent determination of the questions here
involved by the Supreme Court of the United States in re
U.S. v. Pelican, supra [232 U.S. 442 (34 s.et. 396, 58 L.Ed.
676) ], at variance with the rule announced by the Supreme
Court of the state on denying his application for a release,
constitutes exceptional circumstances, and justifies the issuance of the writ. . . . " It is apparent that the instant case
involves no such exceptional circumstances as were present in
Bowen v. Johnston, supra, and Ex parte Van Moore, supra.
Contrary to petitioner's claim the eases of In re Seeley,
29 Ca1.2d 294 [176 P.2d 24], and In re McVickers, 29 Ca1.2d
264 [176 P.2d 40], lend no support to his position. Neither
of these cases involved an attack upon a final judgment of
conviction but were concerned only with the question of
habitual criminal status. This court recognized the distinction when it said in In re Seeley, supra, at page 299, in referring to the decisjon in In re McVickers, supra: "In that
case it was held,tbat an adjudication of habitual criminal
status is not a judgment of conviction but is, in effect, only an
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ancillary and severable determination of a fact pertinent to
the length of imprisonment and right to parole, and hence
that such determination is not necessarily characterized by
the high degree of finality of a final judgment of conviction."
The federal courts have distinguished, as we have here,
between habeas corpus proceedings involving claims of lack
of jurisdiction upon grounds similar to those here involved
and those wherein a petitioner has contested jurisdiction on the
ground that he was denied due process of law at his trial.
Thus while the federal courts, as appears from the cited
authorities, have consistently refused to redetermine questions of status of the parties or the locus of the crime on the
basis of facts not appearing on the face of the trial court
record, they have shown a willingness to look to evidence
dehors the record where a petitioner has claimed that he has
been denied his fundamental constitutional rights. (See
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 [58 8.0t. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461,
146 A.L.R. 357] ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 [55 S.Ot.
340, 79 L.Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406] ; Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86 [43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543] ; Frank v. Mangum, 237
U.S. 309 [35 S.Ot. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969] ; see also United States
ex reI. McCann v. Adams, 320 U.S. 220 [64 S.Ot. 14, 88 L.Ed.
4] ; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 [62 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed.
1302].)
,
.
It therefore appears that both reason and authority support the view that no exceptional circumstances are presented
here and that our inquiry in this proceeding is limited to the
record of the trial court in which the final judgments of conviction were entered. Having concluded that we may not
here consider new and additional facts concerning the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Madera County over the
offenses of which petitioner was convicted, it follows that petitioner's allegation are insufficient to entitle him to any relief
in this proceeding.
The writ is discharged and -petitioner is remanded to custody.
Gibson, O. J., Shenk, J., and McOomb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The conclusion reached by the majority here is predicated
upon the assumption that the scope of review on habeas corpus
in a case such as tl;lis' is limited to matters appearing upon
the face of the record and that a reviewing court may not
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consider pertinent facts aliunde the record even though such
facts are conclusively established and it appears beyond doubt
that the tribunal whose judgment is subject to review was
without jurisdiction to hear and determine tbe cause and
render the judgment which is the subject of review in the
habeas corpus proceeding. In so holding the majority has
ignored or misapplied several recent decisions both by this
court and by the Supreme Court of the United States in which
relief was obtained by means of habeas corpus where the inquiry extended beyond the record on which the judgment
subject to review was based.
The most recent of these cases is that of Chessman v. Tut.,
354 U.S. 156 [77 S.Ot. 1127, 1 L.Ed.2d 1253], decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States on June 10, 1957.
The background of the Chessman case should be well known
to every member of this court. It will be remembered that
on the 21st day of May, 1948, Chessman was found guilty of
17 felonies by a jury in the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County and on June 25, 1948, sentence of death was pronounced against him. The court reporter who reported the
proceedings at the trial died after only 646 out of 1,810 pages
of the trial transcript had been dictated into a recording
machine. Thereafter the deputy district attorney who prosecuted Chessman arranged with one Stanley Fraser who was
an uncle of the wife of the said deputy district attorney to
transcribe the remaining notes of the deceased reporter. The
purported transcription of these notes extended over several
months and finally a purported record was submitted to the
trial court, and in the absence of Chessman or his counsel,
testimony was offered on behalf of the prosecution with respect to the accuracy of said record which was finally approved by the trial jUdge. The proceedings for the settlement
of said record were attacked by Chessman before both the
trial court and this court, but this court affirmed the order
of the trial court on May 19, 1950, with two justices dissenting (People v. Chessman, 35 Ca1.2d 455 [218 P.2d 769, 19
A.L.R.2d 1084]). Thereafter the case was presented to this
court on the record so approved and the judgment of death
pronounced against Chessman was affirmed with the same two
justices dissenting (People v. Chessman, 38 Ca1.2d 166 [238
P.2d 1001]). Petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the United States was thereafter denied (Chessman v. California, 343 U.S. 915 [72 S.Ot. 650, 96 L.Ed. 1330]). Thereafter, and on July '16, 1954, Chessman presented to this court

I
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a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that
he was denied due process of law because of fraud perpctrated
by the prosecution in the transcription and settlement of said
record, alleging in his said petition certain facts which were
not known to him at the time the other proceedings above
mentioned were before this court. This I!ourt denied said petition on July 21, 1954, and certiorax:i to the Supreme Court
of the United States was later denied without prejudice to
Che.ssman applying for a writ of habeas corpus to a federal
district court (Chessman v. CaZ·ifornia, 348 U.S. 864 {75 S.Ct.
85, 99 L.Ed. 681]). He later applied to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, Southern Division, alleging substantially the same facts which were
contained in his application for habeas corpus to the Supreme
Court of California. This application was summarily denied
by Judge Goodman of the United States District Court, and
his decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit (Chessman v. Teets, 221 F.2d 276).
The Supreme Court of th~ United States thereafter reversed
the 9th Circuit Court uf Appeals and Judge Goodman and
directed that Chessman be given a hearing on his application
(Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 [76 S.Ct. 34, 100 L.Ed. 4]).
He was thereafter given a hearing by Judge Goodman who
denied him any relief and Judge Goodman's decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th (lircuit, one judge dissenting (Chessman v. Teets, 239 F.2d 205).
Thereafter the Supreme Court of the United States granted a
writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the 9th Circuit, and on June 10, 1957, reversed the decision of
the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and Judgc Goodman, holding
squarely that Chessman had been denied due process of law
by the proceeding in the trial court which purported to settle
the record on which this court affirmed his conviction. The
effect of this decision is to render null and void, not only
Judge Goodman's decision, but the order of the state trial
court approving the trial record and all of the decisions of
this court in denying Chessman relief.
In its opinion the Supreme Court of the United States
declared: "On October 17, 1955, this Court, reversing the
Court of Appeals, remanded to the District Court for a hearing petitioner's applicat.ion for a writ of habeas corpus, charging fraud in the prep-atation of the state court r:f!cord, which
had been summarily dismissed by the District Court. 350
U.S. 3 [76 8.Ct. 34, 100 L.Ed. 4]. This resulted in the judg-
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ment which is now before us. The District Court held that no \
fraud had been shown. The record of proceedings held before I
District Judge Goodman reveals the following additional fact, I
as to the preparation of the state court record, none of which I
appear to be disputed by the State, which has been ably and
conscientiously represented here: Fraser, the substitute re- '
porter, was an uncle by marriage of the deputy district attorney in charge of this case, a fact of which neither the .tate
trial court nor the appellate court were aware when they approved the transcript. In preparing the transcript, Fraser
worked in close collaboration with the prosecutor, and also
went over with two police officers, who testified for the State
at the trial, his transcription of their testimony. Tht latter
episodes were likewise tlrtknown to the state court. when they I
approved the transcript. The testimony of one of these officers concerned petitioner's alleged confession, a subject of
dispute at the trial, and petitioner's list of alleged inaccuracies,
already mentioned, related to some of that testimony. It also
appeared at this hearing that Fraser had destroyed the 'rough'
draft of his transcription which petitioner had sought to obtain during the settlement proceedings.
"Under the circumstances which have been summarized,
we must hold that the ex parte settlement of this state court
record violated petitioner's constitutional right to procedural
due process . ... [Footnotes 12 and 13:]
"In view of our holding we cannot regard ourselves as
concluded by the California Supreme Court's holdings that
the record on which it acted was adequate as a matter of
state law, and that, in any event, the inaccuracies then claimed
by the petitioner would not have changed the result of his
appeal. Petitioner is entitled to have his conviction reviewed
upon a record which has been settled in accordance with procedural due process. Moreover, in holding as it did the state
court was not aware of the fact lafer developed in hearings
before Judge Goodman, see p. 5, supra, and we cannot know
that those facts, and others that might be disclosed upon an
adversary hearing focused squarely on the adequacy of the
transcript, would not lead it to a different conclusion.
"Certainly this Court's previous denials of certiorari, 350
U.S. 840 [71 S.Ct. 29, 95 L.Ed. 616] ; 341 U.S. 929 [71 S.Ot.
800, 95 L.Ed. 1359]; 343 U.S. 915 [72 S.Ct. 650, 96 L.Ed.
1330] ; 346 U.S. 916 [74 8.Ct. 278, 98 L.Ed. 412] j 348 U.S.
864 [75 S.Ct. 85,99 L.Ed. 681], do not foreclose us from now
granting appropriate relief. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
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[73 S.Ot. 897, 97 L.Ed. 469]. And it tMy be ",oted tkat. it
was ",ot "",til the present proceeding. in the District COUt"t
tka.f tke fact. IUfTounding tke ,etflement of the ,tate oov,rt
record were ftilly developed." (Emphasis added.)
From the foregoing excerpt from the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Chessman case it is
manifest that the Supreme Court considered numerous facts
entirely outside of the record both of the trial court and this
court· when the Chessman case was being considered by the
courts of this state.
There can be no question but that the effect of the holding
of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Chessman
ease is"that the ez parle settlement of this state court record
violated petitioner'8 constitutional right to procedural due
process. " Such being the case, the question arises as to what
eonstitutes "procedural due process." There can be no question but that at least one of the essential elements of "procedural due process" is a tribunal which has the power to hear
and determine the rights of the litigants (11 Ca1.Jur.2d p.
788, § 313 et seq.), and since "procedural due process" may
be established by proof of facts outside of the record, it must
necessarily follow that a reviewing court may resort to facts
outside of the record for the purpose of deterIpining whether
or not the tribunal rendering the judgment sought to be reviewed had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the litigation.
There can be no escape from this conclusion in view of the
pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States
in the recent case of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465,
466,467 [58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357], wherein it was declared: "True, habeas corpus cannot be used as a
means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities--not involving the question of iurisdiction-occurring during the
course of trial; and the' writ of habeas corpus cannot be used
as a writ of error.' [Woolsey v. Best, 299 U.S. 1, 2 (57 S.Ct.
2, 81 L.Ed. 3).] These principles, however, must be construed and applied so as to prcserve--not destroy--constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty. The &9cope of
inquiry in ha.beas corpus proceedings has been broadenednot narrowed-since the adoption of the Sixth Amendment.
In such a proceeding, 'it would be clearly erroneoUs to confine the inquiry to the proceedings and judgment of the triaZ
court' [Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 327 (35 S.Ct. 582,
59 L.Ed. 969)] arid the petitioned court has ' powel to inquire
with regard to tke iurisdiction of tke inferior oov,rl, eithe.-
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in respect to the mbject matter or to the person, even if 8UCh
inquiry • •• [involves] an examination of facts outside of,
but Mt incomistent with, tM record.' [In re Mayfield, 141
U.S. 107, 116 [11 S.Ct. 939, 35 L.Ed. 635] ; Cuddy, Petitioner,
131 U.S. 280 [9 s.Ot. 703, 33 L.Ed. 154].J Congress has expanded the rights of a petitioner for habeas corpus [28 U.S. C.,
ch. 14, § 451, et seq.] and the ' ••• effect is to substitute for
the bare legal review that seems to have been the limit of
judicial authority under the common-law practice, and under
the Act of 31 Car. II, c. 2, a more searching investigation, ;
in which the applicant is put upon his oath to set forth the '
truth in the matter respecting the causes of his detention,
and the court, upon determining the actual facts, is to "dispose of the party as law and justice require."
" 'There being no doubt of the authority of the Congress
to thus liberalize the common law procedure on habeas corpus
in order to safeguard the liberty of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States against infringement through
any violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty established
thereunder, it results that under the sections cited a prisoner
in custody pursuant to the final judgment of a state court of
criminal jurisdiction may have a judicial inquiry in a court !
of the United States into the very truth and s:ubstance of the .
causes of his detention, although it may become necessary
to look behind and beyond the record of his conviction to II
sufficien't extent to test the juri.sdiction of the state court to
proceed to a judgment against him. . . .
" '. . . it is open to the courts of the United States npon
an application for a writ of kabeas corpus to look beyond
forms and inquire into the very substance of the matter,
,,, (Emphasis added.) Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S.
309, 327 [35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969]; Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86 [43 S.0t. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543J ; Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.s. 103 [55 S.Ot. 340,79 L.Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406] ; Hans
Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176 [9 S.Ot. 672, 33 L.Ed.
118]. The court concluded with the stateTllent that "The
judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain
release by habeas corpu.~. A judge of the Unitf\d States-to
whom a petition for habeas corpus is addressed--should be
alert to examine 'the facts for himself when if true as alleged
they make the tri{11 absolutely void.''' (Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86,92 [43 S.Ot. 265, 67L.Ed. 543] j Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 313 [50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854,
, 70 A.L.R. 263].)
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The holding of the majority in the ease at bar is in direct
conflict with every decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States since Prank v. Mangum, tupra, which was
decided over 40 years ago.
In Bowen v. Johnston (1939), 806 U.S. 19, 26, 27 [59 S.Ot.
442, 83 L.Ed. 455] (relied upon by the majority for the
proposition that "exceptional circumstances" must exist before evidence outside the record may be examined) habeas
corpus was denied on the ground that the federal district
court had exclusive jurisdiction to try the petitioner for
murder. The petitioner's allegation was that the federal
court did not have jurisdiction to try him. The United States
Supreme Court held that the requirement that a litigant resort
to appellate procedure "is not a rule denying the power to
issue a writ of habeas corpus when it appears that nevertheless the trial court was without jurisdiction. The rule is
not one defining power but one which relates to the appropriate exercise of power." The court then proceeded to
elaborate by showing that the same circumstances were present there that we have in the case at bar. It was said: "[T]he
rule is not so inflexible that it may not yield to exceptional
circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by
the writ of habeas corpus is apparent. Among these e~cep
tional circumstances are those indicating a conflict between
state and federal authorities on a question of law involving
concerns of large importance affecting their respective juristhe Bowen case evidence
dictions." (Emphasis added.)
outside the record was apparently considered inasmuch as
the district court which had tried petitioner had given no
consideration to the jurisdictional question since as the court
stated "The matter stood without any judicial explanation
and without appeal." (P. 27.) It therefore clearly appears
that the so-called "exceptional circumstances" present in
the Bowen case are also present in the case under consideration.
In Waley v. Johnston (1942),316 U.S. 101, 104 [62 S.Ct.
964, 86 L.Ed. 1302], habeas corpus was granted on evidence
outside the record. The court said: "The issue here [whether
petitioner's plea of guilty had been coerced] was appropriately raised by the habeas corpus petition. The facts relied
on are dehors the record and their effect on the judgment was
not open to consideration and review on appeal." (Emphasis
added.)
, .
/'
In Vnifpn .f:ifates ex reZ. McCann v. Adams (1948),320 U.S. ,
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220,221 [648 S.Ot. 14, 88 L.Ed. 4J, habeas corpus was granted
on petitioner's allegation that he had not intelligently waived
his right to counsel and a jury trial. The court said: ·'That the
issue [whether he waived his right to counsel and jury trial],
ft.OW fairly tendered by the petition for habeas corpus below,
has never been adjudicated on its merits by the lower courts.
But it is no longer within the bosom of the trial court. Nor
can it be disposed of on appeal of his conviction, for the claim
rests on material dehors the trial proceedings." (Emphasis
added.) Once again it is apparent that evidence outside
the record may be considered on a petition for habeas corpus.
In Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87, 90 [43 S.Ot. 265,
67 L.Ed. 543] (decided in 1923 and before the Johnson
case, 304 U.S. 458 [58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R.
357]) habeas corpus was granted on evidence outside the
record on petitioners' allegation that they had been denied
due process of law because their convictions of murdering
a white man had been obtained through mob pressure at a
trial which lasted three-quarters of an hour.
In Frank v. Mangum (1915), 237 U.S. 309, 326, 331 [85
S.Ot. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969], habeas corpus was denied on the
ground that the state court's prior determination of the
truth of petitioner's allegations was conclusive. It was held,
however, that a court of competent jurisdiction was an essential element of due process; and that while evidence outside
the record could not be considered at common law, the scope
of review had been broadened. The court stated: "There
being no doubt of the authority of the Congress to thus
liberalize the common law procedure on habeas corpus in
order to safeguard the liberty of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States against the infringement through
any violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty established
thereunder, it results that under the sections cited a prisoner
in custody pursuant to the final jUdgment of a state court
of criminal jurisdiction may have a judicial inquiry in a
court of the United States into the very truth and substance
of the cause of his detention although it may become necessary to look behind and beyond the record of his conviction
to a sufficient extent to test the jurisdiction of the state court
to proceed to judgment against him." It was also held that
"In the light, then, of these established rules and principles:
that due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment had regard to.substance of right, and not to matters of
form and procedu're: that it is open to the courts of the
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United States upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus

to look beyond the forms and inquire into the very substance
of tke matter • • • whether they appear m the record or
not . ••. "
As to the attempt on the part of the majority to distinguish

)

)

cases on the ground that certain specified rights such as
denial of counsel, use of perjured testimony, and a conviction under an unconstitutional law, is concerned, it should be
specifically noted that in the case of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 [58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357], the
court emphatically held that the right to counsel was jurisdictional, and that when a "jurisdictional question" was
involved" 'it would be clearly erroneous to confine the inquiry
to the proceedings and judgment of the trial court.' "
In the case of Tooisgah v. United States, 186 F.2d 93,
which the majority holds is "not helpful" to Carmen, the
question of jurisdiction of the federal district court had been
raised at the trial and affirmed on appeal. On a collateral
attack on the jUdgment of conviction based on the ground
that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction because the land
on which the crime had been committed was not "Indian
country," the court reversed its former decision and remanded
the cause with directions to vacate the judgment and dismiss
the indictment. It was held that "The question is one of law
whether the agreed and adjudicated facts bring the offense
within that class over which exclusive federal jurisdiction is
extended by statute. Since the motion goes squarely to the
jurisdiction of the court on agreed facts; involves human
liberties, as well as a possible conflict between state and
federal jurisdiction over crimes committed within the boundaries of a sovereign state; and since the question of jurisdiction was not presented or painstakingly considered in the
direct appeal, we deem it appropriate to re-examine it here. "
(Emphasis added.) On the direct appeal from the judgment
of conviction Carmen, in the~ase at bar, tried unsuccessfully,
to raise the question of jurisdiction. A majority of this court
refused his application but intimated that he might have another remedy. The majority seeks to distinguish the Toosigah
case on the ground that "no new or additional facts" were
sought to be injected into the case and "no adjudicated facts
. . . sought to be impeached." Davis v. Johnston, 144 F.2d
862, is not like the caSe at bar. There the pctition(:r for a writ
of habeas corpus had been tried by the federal district court
and that court's jurisdiction had been in issue and directly
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litigated in the lower court and a finding was made thereon.
In the case at bar the state court assumed jurisdiction and
this court would not permit the question of lack of jurisdiction to be raised on ~ppea1. In Matter of Heff, 197 U.S. 488
[25 S.Ct. 506,49 L.Ed. 848], the Supreme Court issued a writ
of habeas corpus because there was a direct conflict between
the state and local federal courts on the precise point of law
involved, each asserting jurisdiction over the same offense. The
Supreme Court in commenting on its holding in the Neff case
in In re Lincoln, 202 U.S. 178, 183 [26 S.Ct. 602, 50 L.Ed.
984], said that the Court of Appeals in the Neff case "had
already decided the question adversely to the contention of
petitioner, so that a writ of error from that court would have
accomplished nothing; and further, that the matter involved
opened up inquiry into questions of great significance affecting the resj)ective jurisdictions of the nation and the dates
over large numbers of Indians. There were special reasons,
therefore, for our issuing a writ of habeas corpus and investigating the matter in that ease." (Emphasis added.) It was
concluded that it could be "assumed that the trial courts
will follow the rulings of this court, and if there be in any
ease a departure therefrom the proper appellate court will
correct the error." In Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U.S. 542, 549
[29 S.Ct. 416, 53 L.Ed. 644], the Supreme Court, quoting from
Louisville Trust 00. v. Oomingor, 184 U.S. 18, 25 [22 S.Ct.
293, 46 L.Ed. 413], said: "Jurisdiction as to the subjectmatter may be limited in various ways, as to civil and criminal cases; cases at common law or in equity or in admiralty;
probate cases, or cases under special statutes; to particular
classes of persons; to proceedings in particular modes; and
so on. In many cases jurisdiction may depend on the ascertainment of facts in'\'olving the merits, and in that sense the
court exercises jurisdiction in disposing of the preliminary inquiry, although the result may be that it finds that it cannot
go farther. And where, in a case like that before us, the court
erroneously retains jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits, its
action can be corrected on review." (And see United States
v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 [27 S.Ct. 165, 51 L.Ed. 319].)
So far as the rule in this state is concerned, I had thought
it settled by In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488, 501 [122 P.2d 22],
that a "petitioner seeking habeas corpus, however, is not
confined to the face of the record in attempting to sustain
the burden of pro;ving that his convictioll was in violation
of his constitutional rights. The courts of both the United

!
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States and California have declared that the remedy of habeas
corpus permits an examination not only of the actual evidence
introduced at petitioner's trial but of any necessary additional
evidence bearing upon the infringement of petitioner's constitutional rights. (Moore v. Demp$ey, 261 U.S. 86 [43 S.Ct.
265,67 L.Ed. 543] ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 [55 S.Ct.
340, 79 L.Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406] ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301
U.S. 242 [57 S.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed. 1066] ; Johnson v. Zerbst,
supra; In "e Oonnor, 15 Ca1.2d 161 [99 P.2d 248]; In "e
Oonnolly, 16 Cal.App.2d 709 [61 P.2d 490] ; In "6 Lake, 65
Cal.App.420 [224 P.126] ; In r6 Ohaus, 92 Cal.App. 384 [268
P. 422] ; see, also, Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 [47 S.Ct. 655,
71 L.Ed. 1108] ; De Jonge v. uregon, 299 U.S. 353 [57 S.Ct.
255,81 L.Ed. 278]; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 [55 S.Ct.
579, 79 L.Ed. 1074); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 [53
S.Ot. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527).) This examination is
made, not to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the verdict, but to determine what the verdict actually
was, so that the court may decide whether it violates constitutional guaranties. Such an examination will be made in a
habeas corpus proceeding whenever a petitioner has been
deprived of due process of law, whatever form that deprivation
has taken." We also said (In re Oonnor, 16 Ca1.2<l 701, 712,
713 [108 P.2d 10]) that we had the right, on habeas corpus,
to inquire into jurisdictional facts whether they appear on
the face of the record or not and that the scope of the inquiry might "embrace additional evidence received by this
court either directly or under all order of reference. (In r6
Mooney, 10 Ca1.2d 1 [73 P.2d 554].)"
It has been held that jurisdiction of a subject matter over
which a court has otherwise no jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, stipulation (Abalian v. 7'ownsend Social
Oenter, Inc., 112 Cal.App.2d 441 [246 P.2d 965) ; Miller v.
Miller, 52 Cal.App.2d 443 [126 P.2d 357], agreement (Fletcher
v. Superior Oourt, 79 Cal.App. 468 [250 P. 195)), acquiescence
(Fong Ohuck v. Ohin Po Foon, 29 Cal.2d 552 [176 P.2d 705]),
silence (Tennesen v. Prudential Ins. 00., 8 Cal.App.2d 160
[47 P.2d 1066]), appearance (Sampsell v. Supe,·ior Oourt,
32 Cal.2d 763 [197 P.2d 739]), or estoppel (More Estate, 143
Cal. 493 [77 P. 407]). Jurisdiction of the subject matter
in any proceeding is Ilonferred by law, and cannot be given,
enlarged, or waived by tlle parties (Harrington v. Superior
Oourt, 194 Cal. 185· [228 P. 15]). This means that where
there is a want of jurisdiction of the subject matter, a pur-
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ported judgment or order is void for all purposes (Fletcher
v. Superior Court, 79 Cal.App. 468 [250 p, 195]).
It is appareutly the general rule, both in the federal courts
and the majority of state courts, that lack of jurisdiction of
the subject matter may be raised at any time. In 14 American
Jurisprudence, Courts, section 191, pages 385, 386, the following appears (supported by numerous case citations):
"Where judicial tribunals have no jurisdiction of the subject
matter on which they assume to act, their proceedings are
absolutely void in the strictest sense of the term; and a court
which is competent to decide on its own jurisdiction in a
given case may determine that question at any time in the
proceedings of the cause, whenever that fact is made to appear
to its satisfaction, either before or after judgment. Accordingly, an objection for want of jurisdiction, if it exists, may
be raised by answer or at any subsequent stage of the proceedings; in fact, it may be raised for the first time on appeal.
A court will recognize want of jurisdiction over the subject
matter even if no objection is made. Therefore, whenever a
want of jurisdiction is suggested, by the court's examination
of the ease or otherwise, it is the duty of the court to consider
it, for if the court is without jurisdiction, it is powerless to
act in the ease.
"A plaintiff against whom judgment went in the lower
court may on appeal raise the question of the jurisdiction of
the trial court and have the judgment reversed if the court
did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter, although the
assumption of jurisdiction was to his advantage.
"As heretofore shown, the jurisdiction of a court over the
subject matter of a cause of action may be conferred by law,
and it cannot under any circumstance be conferred on a court,
as such, by the consent of the parties. It naturally follows
that if jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, the want
thereof cannot be waived by any act of the parties."
The same rule appears in 13 California Jurisprudence 2d,
Courts, section 86, page 597: "Where a judicial tribunal has
no jurisdiction of the subject matter on which it assumes
to act, its proceedings are absolutely void in the fullest sense
of the term; and a court, being competent to determine its
own jluisdiction, may determine that question at any time
in the proceedings, whenevp.r that fact is made to appear to
its satisfaction, either before or after jUdgment. Accordingly,
an objection for want.of such jurisdiction may be raised by
answer or at any subsequent stage of the proceedings j in fact
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it may be raised for the first time on appeal. [Mott v. Smith,
16 Cal. 533; Oreditors v. Oonsumers' Lbr. 00., 98 Cal. 318
[33 P. 196] ; Mastick v. Superior Oourt, 94 Cal. 347 [29 P.
869J ; Thompson, In re, 101 Cal. 349 [35 P. 991, 36 P. 98, 508] ;
People v. Oakland Water Front 00., 118 Cal. 234 [50 P. 305] ;
San Diego Sav. Bank v. Goodsell, 137 Cal. 420 [70 P. 299].] ...
"A court should recognize want of jurisdiction over the
subject matter even if no objection is made. Therefore, whenever a want of jurisdiction is suggested, by the court's examination of the case or otherwise, it is the duty of the court to
consider it, for if the court is without jurisdiction it is powerless to act in the case. So fundamental is the necessity that
a court have jurisdiction of the subject matter, that a lack
thereof may be raised on appeal or in another proceeding,
even by the party who invoked the jurisdiction in the first
place." (Emphasis added.)
In Matson Navigation 00. v. United States, 284 U.S. 352
[52 8.Ct. 162, 76 L.Ed. 336], a case arising under the Admiralty Act where exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the
federal courts, the court said: "As the want of jurisdiction
is of the subject matter, it may be considered, and appropriate
judgment given, at any stage of the proceedings, either here
or below. Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U.S. 165, 168 [2 8.Ct. 424,
27 L.Ed. 688] ; Gainesville v. Brown-Orummer Inv. 00., 277
U.S. 54, 59 [48 8.Ct. 454, 72 L.Ed. 781). See Grace v. American Oentral Ins. 00., 109 U.S. 278, 283-284 [3 S.Ct. 207, 27
L.Ed. 932] ; Bors v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252, 255 [4 S.Ct. 407,
28 L.Ed. 419]."
In Gainesville v. Brown-Orummer Inv. 00., 277 U.S. 54,
58, 59 [48 S.Ct. 454, 72 L.Ed. 781], the case had been tried
and appealed in the federal courts. The case went up on
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. That court
said: "Objection is first made by the petitioner that there
was no separable controversy and so no [federal] jurisdiction.
This question does not seem. 10 have been presented to and
was certainly not considered by the Oircuit Oourt of Appeals."
(Emphasis added.) After noting that the question of jurisdiction would seem to have been "abandoned until it is now
renewed in the briefs in this Court," the court said: "Of
course a question of jurisdiction can not be waived. Jurisdiction should affirmatively appear, and the question may be
raised at any time. Grace v. American Oentral Ins. 00., 109
U.S. 278, 283 [3 B..Qt. 207, 27 L.Ed. 932]; Manlfield, O. &7
L. M. R. 00. v. Swan, 111 U.s. 379, 382 [48 8.Ct. 510, 28
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L.Ed. 462] ; Mattingly v. Nurthweste .... Virginia B. 00., 158
U.S. 53, 56, 57 [15 S.(,'t. 725, 89 L.Ed. 894]." (Emphasis
added.)
Bayna Tom Carmen was found gm1ty of the first degree
murder of Wllbllr Dan McSwain and with assault with intent
to murder .Alvin McSwain, Wilbur's brother. On appeal
this court (People v. Carmen, 36 Cal.2d 768 [228 P.2d 281])
reversed the murder ,\onviction and affirmed the conviction
of assault with intent to (~ommit murder. Subsequently, BayDa
Tom Carmen was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder
without recommendation. The judgment wa.'S affirmed by this
court in August, 1954 (People v. Oarmen, 43 Cal.2d 342 [273
P.2d 521]).
On appeal, defendant sought to show by the production
of additional evidence that both he and the deceased, Wilbur
Dan McSwain, were Indians and that the crime occurred
in "Indian country." It was, and is, defendant's argument
that the above facts vest exdusive jurisdiction in the federal
,courts. In the majority opinion in People v. Carmen, 43 Cal.
2d 342, 348 [273 P.2d 521], it was held: "We have concluded
that the proposed offer to produce additional evidence on the
appeal should be denied. Furthermore, even assuming that
additional evidence could be received on appeal in this class
of eases by stipulation or otherwise, the facts stated in the
so-called 'stipulation' as well as shown in the entire record
are insufficient to show exclusive jurisdiction in the federal
courts." It was also said (at page 349): "The evidence presented at the trial is not sufficient to permit a determination
that there is exclusive federal jurisdiction in the present case,
and we do not pass on the question of what remedies may be
available to the defendant to show alleged lack of jurisdiction
in the state court."
After the filing of the opinion in the above mentioned case
and a denial of a petition for a rehearing therein, Carmen
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he raised
the question of lack of jurisdiction in the California courts
and contended that exclusive jurisdiction was in the federal
courts. This court issued a writ of hab<;as corpus returnable
in San Francisco on December 8, 1954.
State ex reI. Du Fault v. Utecht, 220 Minn. 431 [19 N.W.2d
706, 161 A.L.R. 1316], is relied upon heavily by the People
for the proposition ~hat unless the court's lack of jurisdiction
is clear and undisputable from the face of the record, habeas
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corpus ought not to be granted to review an erroneous determination by a court that it has territorial jurisdiction over an
offense and that, in general, an applicant for habeas corpus
in such a case will be left to his remedy by writ of error or
appeal.
In the first instance there are s('!veral distjnguishing features
between the case under consideration and the Utecht case.
First, Utecht cUd flOt raise the question of jUNscUction on
oppeal t.I$ did Cormen in the instant case; ,econdly, ",hile
Utecht ",as a Chippewa Indian, the crime ",as committed (according to the court) upon on Indian allotment for ",hick.
trust patent kacl been issued. The crime in the Carmen case
was ~ouunitted on the Maggie Jim Allotment but the land
was at that time still held in trust by the United States government and no fee patent had bf.ltm istIued. (It was issued, subsequent to the crime, in 1952.)
While it is difficult to ascertain the exact holding in the
Utecht case, the following statement (page 707) appears to
recognize that had no fee patent been issued, a different solution might have been reached: "The facts ,et out in petitioner', opplication for the "'"t of kabeas corpus, if true,
w01dd deprive the state courts of jurisdiction in this matter.
A 'tate', jurisdiction does not eztenil over individual member,
of on Indian tr~De in ,o-coUed 'Indian country.' State 'Y.
Jackson, 218 Mjnn. 429 [16 N.W.2d 752] .•••
"In the original proceedings before the district court of
Carlton county, there is no reference to the fact that the place
where the crime was committed was within an Indian reservation on an Indian allotment, and no reference to the fact that
relator is a member of the Chippewa tribe of Indians and a
ward of the government, except that at the pre-sentence
examination relator was asked by the court:
" 'Let's see: Do you belong to the Chippewa tribe: A.
Yes.' "
The Utecht case was, apparently, decided on the theory
that defendant should havl'~-brought thE' court's lack of jurisdiction (although this is· dubious sillce the crime was committed on land to which a patent in fee bad been issued and
was, hence, no Jonger Indian country) to the attention of the
court on appeal. Utecht did not perfect an appeal. Carmen
sought to have the matter determined on appeal. It will be
recalled that a majority of this court determined (43 Ca1.2d
342) that Carmen's'''proposed offer to produce additional en-
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dence on the appeal should be denied. Furthermore, even l
assuming that additional evidence couId be received on appeal
in this class of cases by stipulation or otherwise, the facta i
stated in the so-called 'stipulation' as well as shown in the
entire record are insufficient to show exclusive jurisdiction \
in the federal courts. . • •
.
"The evidence presented at the trial is not sufficient to 1\
permit a determination that there is exclusive federal jurisdiction in the present case, and we do not pass on the question of
what remedies may be aoo,,'labZe to the defendant to .how
alleged lack of jurisdiction in the ,tate court. Nothing in
the record indicates that the location of the crime was 'Indian
country' within the meaning of any of the statutes which have
been cited. (See e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152,1153, and 3242.)
While there was evidence that defendant and the victim were i
'Indians,' the use of this term, without more, shows only that
the persons were Indians by race and blood." (Emphasis
added.) We know, therefore, that tke fo,ct that defendant and
the deceased were bDth Indians appeared on the face of 1M
record.
It is of interest to note that m the courts of the United
States (see discussion, supra), there may be a juclicial inquiry
into the very truth and substance of the causes of a defendant'.
detention although it may become necessary to look behind
and beyond· the record of his conviction to a suflicient extent
to test the jurisdiction of the state court to proceed to a judgment against him. (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466-468
[58 S.Ct. 1019,82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357]; Wong Doo v.
United States, 265 U.S. 239 [44 S.Ct. 524, 68 L.Ed. 999];
Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 [44 S.Ct. 519,68 L.Ed. 989].)
The Utecht case, while factually very similar, has really
no application to the case at bar. A majority of this CDUrt
refused to permit Carmen to produce additional eVidtMe on
appeal on the question of jurisdiction of the subject matter;
there was no appeal in the Utecht case where that court held
the question of jurisdiction should have been considered. The
crime in the Carmen case was committed in Indian country;
in the Utecht case, a patent in fee had been issued (see the
various cases cited infra holding that an Indian is emancipated
when he has received a patent in fee to land; and section 349.
title 25, U.S.C.A., which provides that when the lands have been
so conveyed "then .each and every allottee shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the
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State or Territory in which they may reside..•. ") In
Minnesota there is an appeal from the denial of a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus and there may not be successive petitions for the writ on the same set of facts. Such is not the
law in California.
In State ex reI. Irvine v. ~strict Court, 125 Mont. 398 [239
P.2d 272, 275], the accused was an Indian. The crime of
burglary committed on an Indian reservation was involved.
The Montana court held that it had no jurisdiction in that
exclusive jurisdiction was in :the federal courts; that defend~
ant was an Indian and a ward of the government. It was
held that the question of jurisdiction "should be inquired into
by the court at the earliest inception on its own initiative
to ascertain whether that particular court has jurisdiction of
that class of offense. In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 758 [8 S.Ot.
1263, 32 L.Ed. 274] ; Barnes v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 188 F.2d 86,
89; Tooisgah v. United States, 10 Cir., 186 F.2d 93, 96.
u It should be kept in mind that all congressional legislation
relative to Indians and Indian affairs has been initiated and
enacted for the benefit of the Indian. As was stated by the
supreme ('ourt, 'According to a familiar rule, legislation affecting the Indians is to be construed in their interest, and
a purpose to make a radical departure is not· lightly to be
inferred.' United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 599, 600 [36
S.Ct. 696, 698, 60 L.Ed. 1192].
" 'The policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history.'
Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 [65 S.Ct. 989, 89 L.Ed. 1367]."
It was also held that .. Exclusive jurisdiction over the Indian
for this purpose has always been claimed and asserted by
the general government, on the ground that the Indian is a
ward thereof, and dependent thereon, and until fully emancipated and discharged from that condition, Title 25, § 349,
U.S.C.A., the federal government continlles to assert its exclusive jurisdiction to punish its ward for the committing
of the enumerated offenses." ...
With the above rules in mind, on May 26, 1955, this court
made an order of reference propounding certain question~
t.o counsel for petitioner Carmen and the attorney general.
Pursuant to said order, hearing'~ were beld and testimony
taken at Sacramento on December 14. 1955, at Madera on
February 20, 1956, and at San QUE'ntin on February 2~, 1956.
On May 17, 1956,'the referee, the Honorable John P. McMur.
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ray, Judge of the Superior Court of Inyo County, California,
filed with this court the following findings:·
"1. Did Haytia Tom Carmen and Wilbur Dan McSwain
belong to a tribe or tribes of Indians' If so, the extent, nature
and character of the tribal organization.
"Your Referee finds that Rayna Tom Carmen and Wilbur
Dan McSwain did belong to a tribe of Indians, namely, the I
Mono Indians who live in the North Fork area in Madera
County in this state.
liThe extent, nature and charact.er of the tribal organiza.
tion to which these men belonged was a loose type of tribal
organization which, however, has its own language. Perhaps
the main distinguishing tribal feature is a primitive burial \'
ceremony upon the death of a member of the tribe.
The tribe is divided into two classes, the Eagles and the II
Coyotes. If a Coyote dies, the Eagles render certain services
at his funeral and vice versa. The squaws, if a member of the
family dies, cut their hair short during the funeral. The
funeral consists in a celebration of several days at which
there is a great deal of crying and some singing. A year after I
the funeral ceremony the members of the family of the de· I
ceased abstain from eating meat or greasy foods for twenty. !
four hours and before a second ceremony begins the partici. I
pants in the ceremony wash their faces with a gray odoriferous
weed which is called 'sorrop' in the Mono language. Some
members of the tribe still weave baskets of distinctive designs and use the cradleboard of 'hoops' in which to carry
babies. These cradleboards are woven in such a manner
as to allow the sex of the child to be put on the eyeshade after
the child is born. The child's sex is indicated by a tribal
pattern, one indicating that the baby is a boy and the' other
indicating that the baby is a girl. The members of the tribe
at times meet in order to raise money to protect their interests
as Indians. The meetings are held as a tribal matter, but the
protection sought is as California Indians, not as Mono
Indians. They also hold social gatherings several times a year
which are restricted to the merebers of the tribes. It is customary for members of the tribe to collect acorns which are
ground into flour and meal and are baked into bread. They
also consider the butterfly worm as a delicate item of diet.

I
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• A majority of thi8 eourt now nently Bidesteps the ilndings of the
Referee on the questi9Iis propounded by Btating that it iB unneee8sary
to diseuBs the question of whether the evidenee is Buffieient to Bupport
the findinil.
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"2. Were petitioner Rayna Tom Carmen and Wilbur Dan
McSwain listed on the census roll of Indians of California
kept by the United States Department of Interior, Bureau
of Indian Affairs, as members of an Indian tribe'
"Yes, both Rayna Tom Carmen and Wilbur Dan McSwain
were listed on the census roll of the Indians of California
kept by the United States Department of Interior, Bureau of
Indian Affairs as members of the Mono tribe of Indians. The
name of Wilbur Dan McSwain, however, was later removed in
accordance with a 1950 amendment dealing with Indians listed
on the census roll. - In order to be eligible for enrollment a
person must have proof of ancestry which goes back to 1852.
The main purpose of this census roll is to determine eligibility
for any land assignment.
"3. If either of them belonged to a tribe of Indians did
they or either of them sever tribal relations or become otherwise emancipated from his tribe'
"Neither of the named persons ever severed tribal relations
or became otherwise emancipated from his tribe.
"4. Had the Department of Indian Affairs acted in any
way toward defendant Rayna Tom Carmen or the victim of
the homicide, Wilbur Dan McSwain'
"The Department of Indian Affairs appeared in the Supreme Court informally on behalf of defendant Rayna Tom
Carmen, but there is no evidence that it at any time acted
in any way toward the victim of the homicide, Wilbur Dan
McSwain. The department collected and delivered to Carmen's mother his distributive share of a judgment obtained
for certain California Indians at a time after his conviction
which led to his present incarceration. Rayna Tom Carmen
also attended the Federal Indian School at Stewart, Nevada.
near Carson City, a federally operated Indian school, and
subsequently went to the Sherman Institute, a federally operated Indian school in Riverside County, California.
"5. To what extent if any did the Department of Indian
Mairs exercise supervisiop over the place of abode or manner
in which these parties lived'
"The Department of Indian Affairs did not exercise any
supervision over the place of abode or manner of life of
• 'j'he transeript of the hearings on referenee showlI, at page 15, that
Wilbur Dan MeSwain's name was removed beeause of his death. Hi,
death oeeurred on April 22, 1950. An amendment was passed on Yay
24, 1950 whieh provideil that persons "must be livin.e on the date of
the Ad in order to,be enroUed."
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either of these parties, but there is testimony that it never
acts in such manner with any California Indians.
"6. Had there been any agreement between the United
\
States and the tribes to which they belonged'
"There had never been any agreement between the United i
States and the tribe to which either of these parties belonged.
"7. Had either of these parties ever received an allotment
of land because he was an Indian or of Indian descent' If so,
what if any disposition has been made of snch land'
"Neither party had ever received any allotment of land
because he was an Indian or of Indian descent. Therefore,
no disposition was ever made of any snch land."
Mr. Linn, Assistant Attorney General, stipulated at the
first hearing on reference (page 3 of the transcript) that "the
United States of America did, on November 26, 1920, issue an
allotment to the foregoing described lands [where the crime
was committed] to Maggie Jim, a Mono Indian, that said
described lands at all times have been and are now· held in
trust by the United States of America." It was also stipulated
by counsel that this allotment was not part of, nor had it been
part of, an Indian reservation.
The only real question here involved is whether the federal
government in 1950, the year in which the crime occurred,
had exclusive jurisdicton over crimes of this type in any ease '
involving Indians and Indian country. This question is also
bypassed by a majority of this court because of its holding
that lack of jurisdiction must appear on the face of the record
in order to entitle a petitioner to its benefits unless· unusual
circumstances appear and that there are no such unusual circumstances in the ease at bar. I have heretofore shown that
this court admitted (43 Ca1.2d 342, 349) that 4C there was evidence that defendant and the victim were' Indians,' " and the
location of the crime was also in evidence at the time of trial
although it may not have been specifically referred to as
Indian Country it was referred to as the "Maggie Jim Allotment. " I am of the opinion, therefore, .that even by adopting
the restrictive rule of the scope of habeas corpus subscribed
to by the majority (and which, in my view, overrules the
more liberal and salutary rules ef In re Bell, 19 Ca1.2d 488
[122 P.2d 22], and In 1'e Connor, 16 Ca1.2d 701 [108 P.2d
10] ), Carmen was entitled to have the question of the juris\'1

• Subsequent to the crime, in 1952, a fee patent to this land was
i8sued to Dan MeSwpn, the father of the victim Wilbur Dan MeSwahl, and the husband of Maigie Jim.
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diction of the California court determined.
One is surely
deprived of a substantial constitutional right when he is tried,
found guilty, and sentenced by a court having no jurisdiction of the subject matter I
Defendant argues that the state court was without jurisdiction in this case and that exclusive jurisdiction was vested
in the United States and its courts by reason of sections 1151,
1152, 1153, and 3242 of the United States Code Annotated, as
amended May 24, 1949. (U.S.C.A., tit. 18.) With this contention I agree.
Section 1151 provides as follows: cc Except as otherwise
provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title [those sections
have reference to sales of liquor to Indians and the definition
of the term 'Indian country' as it relates to the liquor laws],
the term 'Indian country,' as used in this chapter, means (a)
all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way
running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether
within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof,
and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c)
all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the
~ame." (Emphasis added; June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat.
757, amended May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 25, 63 Stat. 94.)
Taking the problem here involved step by step, it has been
stipulated that the crime was committed on an Indian allotment, the Indian title to which had not been extinguished at
the time of the crime. The People argue that in order for
such an allotment to come within the definition of "Indian
country" it must have been part, at one time, of an Indian
reservation. This argument stems from House Report Number 314, 80th Co~gress, page 492, wherein it is stated that
Indian allotments were included in the definition of Indian
country on the authority Of United States v. Pelican, 232
U.S. 442 [34 S.Ct. 396, 58 L.Ed. 676]. In the Pelican case, a
full blood Indian was murdered on land allotted to one Agnes,
an Indian. The allotment had formerly been part of the Colville Indian reservation which, with certain exceptions, had
been, by Act of Congress (July 1, 1892, ch. 140, 27 Stat. 62)
'vacated and restored to the public domain. The ~ceptions
were made by Congress to care for the Indians residing on
that portion of the reservation. Each Indian was entitled to
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select 80 acres which was allotted to him in severalty, the title
being held in trust for his benefit for 25 years and then trans- i
ferred in fee to him or his heirs. During the trust period, the '
lands Were inalienable.
The People's position is that because the allotted lands
were once l'art of an Indian reservation they were considered
by the court to continue to be IndialJ country. The District
Court in the Pelican case had held that the Agnes allotment
was not Indian country within the meaning of the statute.
The Supreme Court reversed. It was said at page 447: "Although the lands were allotted in severalty, they were to he
held in trust by the United States for 25 years for the sole
use and benefit of the allottee, or his heirs, and during this
period were to be inalienable. That the lands, being so held,
continued to be under the jurisdiction and control of Congress
for all governmental purposes relating to the guardianship
and protection of the Indians, is not open to controversy.
United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 437 [23 S.Ot. 478, 47
L.Ed. 532]; McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U.S. 458, 466, 468 [27
S.Ct. 346, 51 L.Ed. 566] ; Couture v. United States, 207 U.S.
581 [28 S.Ct. 259, 52 L.Ed. 350] ; United Sfa.tes v. Celestine,
215 U.S. 278, 290, 291 [30 S.Ot. 93, 54 L.Ed. 195]; United
States v. Sutton, 215 U.S. 291 [30 S.Ot. 116, 54 L.Ed. 200] ;
Marckie'Tiger v. Western Invest. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 315, 816
[31 s.Ot. 578, 55 L.Ed. 738] ; Hallowell v. United States, 221
U.S. 317 [81 S.Ot. 587, 55 L.Ed. 750] ; United States v. Wright,
229 U.S. 226, 237 [33 S.Ct. 630, 57 L.Ed. 1160J." It was
further held (page 449) that "The lands, which, prior to the
allotment, undoubtedly formed part of the Indian country
[as a reservation], still retain during the trust period a distinctively Indian character, being devoted to Indian occupancy under the limitations imposed by Federal legislation.
The explicit provision in the act of 1897, as to allotmerits, we
do not regard as pointing a distinction, but rath("T as emphasizing the intent of Congress in carrying out its policy
with respect to allotments in severalty where these have been
accompanied with restrictions upon alienation or provision
for trusteeship on the part of the Government. In the present
case, the original reservation was Indian country simply because it had been validly set apart for the'use of the Indians
as such, under the superintendence of the Government. DonneUy v. United States, supra [228 U.S. 243 (33 S.Ct. 449, 57
L.Ed. 820, Ann.Case. 1913E 710)]. The same considerations,
in substance, apply 'to the allotted lands which, when the
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reservation was diminished, were excepted from the portion
restored to the public domain. 'l'he allottees were permitted
to enjoy a more secure tenure, Bnd provision was made for
their ultimate ownership without restrictions. But, meanwhue, the lands remained Indian lands, sct apart for Indians
under governmental care j lind we arc unable to find ground
for the conclusion that they became utber than Indian country
through the distribution into separate holdings, the Government retaining control
"It is said that it is not to be Fmpposed that Congress
has intended to maintain the Federal jurisdiction over hundreds of allotments scattered through territory other portions
of which were open to white settlement. But Congress expressly so provided with respect to offenses committed in
violation of the act of 1897. Nor does the territorial jurisdiction of the United StnttJs dependapon the size of the particular
areas which are held for Federal :mrposes (Criminl11 Code,
§ 272). It must be remembered that the fundamental c0nsideration is the protect'ion of a dependent people." (Emphasis
added.) The court continul')d and after explicitly noting that
Congress amended the original act to provide" That until the
issuance of fee-I'imple pat.ents an allottees to whom trust
patents shall hereafter be issucd shall he subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States" ~section 349, title
25, U.S.C.A. continues to so provide) said: "We deem it to
be clear that Congr~ss had the power thus to continue the
guardianship of the Government. {UnUed States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 383, 384 [6 S.Ot. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228] j United
States v. Oelestine, 3upra j lIfarchie Tiger v. Western Invest.
00., supra j Hallowell y. United States, supra; Heckman v.
United States" 224 U.S. 413, 437 {32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820] ;
Ex parte Webb, 225 U.S. 663, 683 [32 S.Ct. 769, 56 L.Ed.
1248] j United States Y. Wright, supra; United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 {34 S.Ct. 1, 58 L.Ed. 7] ; Perrin v. United
States, decided this day, post, p. 478 [232 U.S. 478 (34 S.Ot.
387, 58 L.Ed. 697)]); and these provisions leave no room for
doubt as to the inteTlt of Congress with respect to the maintenance of the J!"ederal jurisdiction over the allotted lands described in the indictment."
The foregoing quotations from the Pelican case show that
the case did not stand for the proposition that allotments
must be carved from Indiau reservations before they could be
considered as falling within the definition of Indian p.ountry.
"It must be remembered that the fundamental consideration
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is the protection of a dependent people." Section 334, title l
25, U.S.C.A. provides for allotments to Indians" not residing
npon a reservation, or for whose tribe no reservation has been
provided by treaty, Act of Congress, or Executive order . . .
and patents shall be issued to them for such lands in the
manner and with the restrictions as provided in sections 348
and 349." Section 349 provides that" At the expiration of
the trust period and when the lands have been conveyed to the
Indians by patent in fee, as provided in section 348, then each
and every allottee shall have the benefit of and be subject to
the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory
in which they may reside . . . Provided further, That until
the issuance of fee-simple patents all allottees to whom trust
pateuts shall be issued shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. . . . " (Emphasis added.) It
clearly appears that neither Congress, nor the Supreme Court
in the Pelican case, intended that the jurisdiction of the
United States over land held in allotment should differ depending upon whether that land had once been part of an
Indian reservation.
The contrary appears to be true in light of the Pelican
case. In that case the argument was that because the land
where the crime occurred was at the time of the crime allotted
to an Indian rather than still part of a reservation it was
no longer "Indian country." The court's entire opinion is
devoted to showing that allotted land, the title to which
was still held in trust by the government, was under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the government for the protection
of the Indian enjoying the use and benefit thereof.
The People rely on United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535
[58 S.Ot. 286, 82 L.Ed. 410], for the proposition that a state
may exercise its criminal jurisdiction over the "same criminal act" and that the federal government does not assert
exclusive jurisdiction in a situation such as we have here.
In the McGowan case the court stated (p. 536) that the only
question for determination was whether the Reno Indian
Colony was Indian country so far as regulation of the sale
of intoxicants to Indians was concerned. It was held (p.
537, et seq.) that "The words 'Indian country' have appeared in the statutes relating to Indians for more than a .
century. We must consider 'the changes which have taken
place in our situation, with a view of determining from time
to time what must b'e regarded as Indian country where it is
spoken of in the statutes.' Also, due regard must be given
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to the fact that from an early period of our history, the Government has prescribed severe penalties to enforce laws
regulating the sale of liquor on lands occupied by Indians
under government supervision. Indians of the Reno Colony
have been established in homes under the supervision and
guardianship of the United States. The policy of Congress,
uniformly enforced through the decisions of this Court, has
been to regulate the liquor traffic with Indians occupying
such a settlement. This protection is extended by the United
States 'over all dependent Indian communities witkin its
borders, whether within its original territory or territory
subsequently acquired, and wketkerwithin or without the
limits of (J 8tate.' {Italics added.]
"The fundamental consideration of both Congress and the
Department of the Interior in establishing this colony has
been the protection of a dependent people. Indians in this
colony have been afforded the same protection by the government as that given Indians in other settlements known as
'reservations.' Congress alone has the right to determine the
manner in which this country's guardianship over the Indians
shall be carried out, and it is immaterial whether Congress
designates (J settlement as a 'reservation' or 'colony.' In the
case of United 8tates v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449 [34 S.Ct.
396, 58 L.Ed. 676], this Court said:
" 'In the present case the original reservation was Indian
country simply because 'it had. been ooUdly set apart for tke
use of the Indians as suck, under the superintendence of the
Government.' [Italics added.]
"The Reno Colony has been validly set apart for the use
of the Indians. It is under the superintendence of the Government. The Government retains title to the lands which it
permits the Indians to occupy. The Government has authority
to enact regulations and protective laws respecting this territory. I • • • Congress possesses the broad power of legislating
for the protection of the Indians wherever they may be within
the territory of the United States .•• ' United 8tatu v.
Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467, 471 [46 8.Ct. 559,70 L.Ed. 1039].
"When we view the facts of this case in the light of the
relationship which has long existed between the Government
and the Indians-and which continues to date-it is not rea.sonably possible to draw any distinction between this Indian
'colony' and 'Indian country.' We conclude that section 247
of Title 25, supra, 40es apply to the Reno Colony.
II The federal prohibition against taking intoxicants into
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tIda Indian colony does not deprive the State of Nevada of its
sovereignty over the area in question. The Federal Government does not, assert exclusive jurisdiction within the colony.
Enactments of the Federal Government passed to protect and
Indian wards only affect the operation, within the
guard
colony, of such state laws as conflict with the federal enactments." (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that the McGowan case does not even
consider whether or not the "Colony" was once part of an
Indian reservation. It is specifically stated that the Colony
consists of approximately 28 acres of land, title to which was
in the United States, and that the colony was created to
provide homes for needy Indians.
It follows, therefore, that title to the land here involved,
known as the Maggie Jim Allotmant, was still held in trust
by the United States government at the time the crime was
committed and that it falls within the statutory definition
of "Indian country." (U.S.C.,A. title 18, § 1151.)
Section 1152 [U.S.C.,A., title 18] provides: "Laws governing.
"Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general
laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall
extend to the Indian country.
'
"This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one
Indian against the person or property of another Indian,
nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe,
or to any ca~e where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the
Indian tribes respectively."
Section 1158 provides in pertinent part: "Offenses committed within Indian country.
"Any Indian who commits against the person or property
of another Indian or other person any of the following of.
fenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, rape, incest, assault
with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson,
burglary, robbery, and larceny within the Indian country,
shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other
persons committing any of the above oiIenses, within the
6uZusive jurisdiction of the United States." (The second
paragraph of this section relates to rape j the third paragraph
to burglary. Both ..Pl'bvide that the crimes shall be defined

.f,
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as provided by the laws of the state in which they are committed. Burglary is to be punished in accordance with the
laws of the state in which it is committed.) (June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 758, amended May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 26, 63
Stat. 94.) (Emphasis added.)
Section 3242 provides that: "All Indians committing any
of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, rape,
incest, assault with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous
weapon, arson, burglary, robbery, and larceny on and within
the Indian ccun~ry, shall be tried in the same courts, and in
the same manner, as are all other persons committing any of
the above crimes within the excluS'it, jurisdiction of the
United States." (Emphasis added; June 25, 1948, ch. 645,
62 Stat. 827, amended May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 51, 63 Stat. 96.)
As hereinbefore set forth, the referee found that both
petitioner and the victim, Wilbur Dan McSwain, were Mono
Indians tind that both were listed as such on the census roll
of Indians of California kept by the United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs.
The People argue that an Indian who has become emanci·
pated in some manner from his tribe is to be treated as a
non-Indian for the purpose of jurisdiction in a case such as
this, and there are cases so holding. In Eugene Sol Louie v.
United States, 274 F. 47, the emancipation of the Indian
took place when he received a patent in fee to land; -in People
v. Ketchum, 73 Cal. 635 [15 P. 353], the defendant was held
not to be a member of any Indian tribe; in State v. Bush, 195
Minn. 413 [263 N.W. 300], the defendant Indian held land
by a patent in fee; -in State v. Monroe, 83 Mont. 556 [274
P. 840], defendant Indian held land by a patent in fee; -in
Peopu ex ret Schuyler v. Livingstone, 123 Misc. 605 [205
N.Y.S. 888], defendant was an Indian, but not a member
of any tribe; in State v. Nimrod, 30 S.D. 239 [138 N.W. 377],
defendant was an Indian and held land by patent in fee under
the Dawes Act; -in State v. Howard, 33 Wash. 250 [74 P.
382], the defendant was an Indian but not a member of any
tribe. In the case under consideration, neither the defendant
Carmen, nor the deceased McSwain, had ever received a patent
in fee from the government or had been otherwise emancipated in any way.
Despite the specific finding of the referee that neither of
the two Indians involved had ever been emaneipated or had
severed tribal relations from the tribe to which they be• See aection S49,,"I'itle 25, U.S.C.A., heretofore quoted.
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longed, the People argue that they were ., emancipated"
Indians; that neither of them was ever controlled in any way
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs or by the Indian organization. It is contended that both Carmen and the deceased
McSwain were free to do as they pleased without interference from either the federal government or by an Indian
agent. The referee specifically pointed out that the Department of Indian Affairs does not exercise supervision over
any California Indians. These arguments of the People are
without merit in view of the referee's findings and the evidence supporting them. The record also shows that the Mono
Indians (including Carmen and McSwain) lived in "tribal
ways"; that they have a "chief"; and that they have "meetings once in a while of their own"; that the burial service is
referred to as a "powwow" (Transcript on Reference, pp.
46,47).
The People also contend that the case of United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 [6 S.Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228], with its
wardship theory, is obsolete. From this it is argued that
because Indians are now citizens of the United States and
of the state in which they reside (U.S.C.A., tit. 8, § 1401
[formerly tit. 8, §§ 601, 604] ; Anderson v. Mathews, 174 Cal.
537 [163 P. 902] ; Piper v. Big Pine School Dist., 193 Cal.
664 [226 P. 926]) they should be subject to the laws of the
state in which they reside. It is said, with merit, that Congress itself has recognized the change in the condition of
the California Indian in that it has expressly stated that
California has jurisdiction over crimes by Indians in Indian
country within the state. Public Law 280 was passed by the
first session of the S3rd Congress, 1953, giving to California
jurisdiction in such situations. The fact remains, however,

that at the time the crime in question was committed Oongress
had fWt seen fit to so act.
The statutes here involved, which in my opinion provide
for exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court in cases such
as this, have a background of wisdom and foresight. Those
conversant with the early history of the western states will
recall the bitter conflicts between the native Indians and the
white immigrants who first settled these states. As a result
of the bitterness engendered by these struggles a strong feeling of prejudice existed against the remaining Indian population after the white man became master of the western
domain and established an organized system of government
therein. The early' history of California is replete with in-
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stances in wllich native Indians were denied redress in our
courts because of this prejudice. As a result of thissituation, which is well known to those whose memories go back
two or three generations, the federal government saw fit, in
the administration of its wardship over the remaining Indian
population, to provide that the federal courts should have
exclusive jurisdiction in cases such as this and thereby removed the Indian from whatever disadvantage he might have
by being prosecuted in state courts in an area where prejudice
against the Indian might still exist. These statutes remained
in effect so far as California is concerned until 1953 which
was long after the commission of the crime here involved.
It appears from the foregoing that since defendant Rayna
Tom Carmen and the victim, Wilbur Dan McSwain, were
unemancipated Mono Indians and that the Maggie Jim Allotment on which the crime occurred was Indian country, the
Superior Court in and for the County of Madera, State of
California, was without jurisdiction to try defendantRayna
Tom Carmen for the crimes with which he was charged.
For the foregoing reasons the prisoner should be discharged.
TRAYNOR, Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the
holding of the court insofar as it constitutes a rule of decision
for the disposition of cases arising in the future". It is clear,
however, from the authoriti",s cited in both the majority and
the dissenting opinion that the question of the availability of
habeas corpus to attack subject matter jurisdiction by proof
of facts outside the record has been clouded in uncertainty
in this state. (See also Edmonds, J., concurring, In re BeU,
19 Ca1.2d 488, 506-507 [122 P.2d 22] ; In re Wyatt, 114 Cal.
App. 557, 562 [300 P. 132] ; 1 Witkin, California Procedure,
Jurisdiction, § 162, pp. 429-430.) The United States Supreme
Court appears to have recognized a similar uncertainty with
respect to the federal rule. (See Rice v. Olson, 824 U.S. 786,
791 [65 S.Ct. 989, 89 L.Ed. 1867].) In Phelan v. Superior
Court, 85 Cal.2d 363 [21'( P.2d 951], this court considered
the effect of uncertainty·in the law as to the adequacy of the
remedy by appeal on the right to attack an order of the trial
court by writ of mandate. It stated: "In view of the uncertainty which has existed in the law with respect to the
appealability of the order in question and also in view of the
holdings of this court that an appeal is not adequate in a case
of this type, petiti<lner should not be denied the use of the
writ because of his failure· to appeal. It would obviously

)
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be a hardship upon a litigant who has been misled by such uncertainty in the law if we were to resolve the uncertainty
and in the same proceeding deny his petition for a writ on the
ground that he in fact did have an adequate remedy by appeal." (35 Ca1.2d at 871-872; see also In re Bine, 47 Ca1.2d
814, 818 [306 P.2d 445].) Similarly, the uncertainty that
has existed as to the availability of the writ of habeas corpus
to attack the jurisdiction of the trial court in a case of this
sort should preclude holding concurrently with the resolution
of that uncertainty that such an attack can only be made in
the trial court, at least when. as in this case, petitioner's attempt to raise th~ issue on appeal ml1kes clear that he has
not sought to abuse the remedy by delaying the attack until
conviction in the federal courts would become difficult or
impossible.
I concur in the conclusiOJ.1 of Justice Carter that the evidence taken before the referee establishes that the Superior
Court in and for the County of Madera, State of California,
was without jurisdiction to try petitioner for the crimes with
which he was charged, and accordingly, I would discharge the
prisoner.
SCHAUER, J., Diss<!nting. -Notwithstanding the long eontinued contest in the litigation before us it appears to me
that there is no real basis for debate on the controlling issue.
If \Ve had a record disclosing a substantial conflict in evidence
as to the facts upon which state jurisdiction depends then
the majority conclusion ",uuld be tenable. But we have no
such record.
Upon the facts shown, the Constitution (art. VI, § 2) and
laws (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151, 1152, 1153, 8242) of the
United States opp.rate to vest exclusive jurisdiction of the
subject matter of this case-the penal responsibility of the
petitioner for the act aUegp,dly constituting the crime for
which he was tried and convicted-in the courts of the United
States. Jurisdiction of the subject ITIatter of an action is
vested in, or prohibitp.d to, a court by the Constitution, federal
or state, and as may be defiDPd or implemented by statutes
which do not transgress constitutional limits. (See Harrington v. 8uperior Court (1924), 194 Cal. 185, 188 [2] [228
P. 15] ["Jurisdiction in any proceeding is conferred by law;
that is, by the constitution or by statute"].) Jurisdiction of
the subjp.ct matter exjsts by law or it does not exist and cannot be acquired. (See 8cklyen v. 8c'hlJ/en (1954), 43Cal.2d

)
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361, 375 [17] [273 P.2d 897] ; Taylor v. Taylor (1923), 192
Cal. 71, 78 [6] [218 P. 756, 51 A.L.R. 1074] ["Neither a
party, nor both parties, can vest a court with jurisdil!tion to
which it is a strallger"] ; King v. Kutner-Goldstein Co. (1901),
135 Cal. 65, 67 [67 P. 10]; Cosia v. Banta (1950), 98 Cal.
App.2d 181, 182 [2] [219 P.2d 478] ; Higgins v. Coyne (1946),
75 Cal.App.2d 69, 70 [1] [170 P.2d 25] ; Glass v. Bank of
America etc. Assn. (1936), 17 Ca1.App.2d 645, 647 [3] [62
P.2d 764] ; Mannix v. Superior Court (1933), 133 Ca1.App.
740, 743 [3] [24 P.2d 507] ["A court cannot, by presuming
to act, invest itself with jurisdiction"].) "[ J] udicial duty
is not less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction [or, here, jurisdiction which the Congress has declared
is in the federal courts] than in exercising firmly that which
the Constitution and the laws confer." (Ex parte McCardle
(1868),7 Wall. (U.S.) 506,515 [19 L.Ed. 264].)
Since by force of federal law jurisdiction over petitioner's
act and his penal responsibility therefor is vested in the federal courts and therefore prohibited to California the petitioner is entitled to discharge from state custody.

